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Abstract – Samuel Beckett's interest in St. Augustine is manifest throughout his oeuvre, both in terms of 
content and style, and can be traced from his very first works, such as Whoroscope, to his last plays and 
short stories. Although this interplay has been touched upon in the critical discourse on Beckett, a systematic 
analysis is still to be done. This paper represents a preliminary investigation into the Augustinian influence 
in the early Beckett, in particular Dream of Fair to Middling Women and Murphy. By considering the 
presence of the Confessions in these two novels I intend to show how St. Augustine's work played a 
significant role in the development of the young author, offering him the occasion to overcome his theory of 
habit as outlined in his early essay, Proust. In this text, Beckett posits habit as merely “the generic name for 
the countless treaties concluded between the countless subjects that constitute the individual and their 
countless correlative objects”. Dream still endorses this perspective, but already suggests a different dialectic 
of memory, will, and habit. This shift, I argue, can be connected to Beckett’s reading of Augustine's 
meditations, in book VIII of the Confessions, on the cleavage between the spirit and the flesh. In Murphy, we 
see Beckett’s 'Augustinian dialectic' fully formed: habit is no longer a veil of Maya that hides the real 
essence of the individual, but the condition of possibility for the subject's flight from the big world towards 
the truth of the inner self.  
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From overt citations and imitations in style to the most cryptic of intertextual references, 
Samuel Beckett's oeuvre is riddled with references to St. Augustine, and the two authors 
seem to share more than a few shallow affinities. Indeed, as Mary Bryden claims, “if the 
young Augustine and the young Sam had been contemporaries, they might have got on 
very well (with Augustine probably being the more ferociously energetic and pro-active of 
the two)” (Bryden 1998, p. 88). However, although this interplay has been touched upon 
in the critical discourse on Beckett, a systematic analysis is still to be done.
1
 This paper is 
a preliminary investigation into the Augustinian influence in the early Beckett: by 
addressing this aspect of the writer's work I intend to provide a fresh analysis of the texts 
and open up potential areas for future inquiry. Of course, my aim is not to reduce Beckett's 
works to the Augustinian influence in his texts, but to explore Augustine's role in the 
context of the broader creative process of the author. In doing this, it will be important to 
take into due account how literary texts, and those by Beckett in particular, “invent their 
own precursors” (Caselli 2005, p. 4), that is to say they do not simply absorb the contents 
and form of the source text, but they establish a dialogue with it. Just like in the case of 
Dante, analysed by Caselli, Augustine cannot be reduced to a mere formula that always 
 
1
  See Houston 2002, Green 1994, and Barry 2009. 
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plays the same role in different episodes of Beckett's oeuvre; it rather represents a 
multifaceted conceptual tool that works in different ways within different contexts. 
 The first reference to Augustine in Beckett's oeuvre appears in his earliest 
published work, Whoroscope. Towards the end of the poem, in which Beckett depicts a 
hot-blooded Descartes' recollections, Augustine is stigmatised as a “coy old froleur”. 
 
Fallor, ergo sum! 
The coy old froleur! 
He tolle'd and legge'd 
and he buttoned on his redemptorist waistcoat. 
No matter, let it pass. 
I'm a bold boy I know 
so I'm not my son 
(even if I were a concierge) 
nor Joachim my father's 
but the chip of a perfect block that's neither old nor new, 
the lonely petal of a great high bright rose. (Beckett 2002, p. 7) 
 
At this point of his career, Beckett's direct knowledge of St. Augustine's works was 
probably quite superficial, but the passage demonstrates how the author was already 
familiar, perhaps not directly, with a crucial section from the Confessions. It is the episode 
of the Tolle, lege (here becoming ironically “tolle'd and legge'd'”) and the transformation 
Augustine undergoes from a life of debauchery to a state of repentance and a conversion to 
a life of prayer. 
Beckett attributes anger and frustration to the French philosopher, who blames 
Augustine's conversion of being too readily attained.  He plays on Augustine's quote Si 
fallor, sum (if I am mistaken, I am)
2
 blending it with Descartes' Cogito, ergo sum (I think, 
therefore I am). This word play is probably a reference to a section in Descartes' own 
responses to the objections to his Meditations, and in particular to those of Antoine 
Arnauld, who had identified affinities between the philosopher and St. Augustine. 
Descartes' views on this point are duly reported in Baillet's biography, which, as scholars 
have noted, was Beckett's primary source of information on Descartes.
3
 
 
Vous m'avez obligé, dit-il, de m'avertir du passage de Saint Augustin, auquel mon je pense 
donc je suis a quelque rapport. Je trouve véritablement qu'il sen sert pour prouver la certitude 
de notre être, et ensuite pour faire voir qu'il y a en nous quelque image de la Trinité, en ce que: 
1. nous sommes; 2. nous savons que nous sommes; 3. nous aimons cet être et ce savoir, qui est 
en nous. Au lieu que je m'en sers pour faire connaître que ce moi qui pense est une substance 
immatérielle, et qui n'a rien de corporel; qui sont deux choses fort différentes. (Baillet 2012, p. 
973) 
 
Beckett amplifies the opposition between the two philosophers in order to intensify his 
own poetic discourse. Beckett's Descartes superimposes Augustine's biography to his 
philosophy; as such, Si fallor, sum, becomes a justification for an easy repentance, as if his 
previous failings were the catalysts of his conversion. Within the context of the poem, 
then, Augustine's “motto” stands for a more anthropological notion of the limits of 
 
2
  See City of God, XI, 26, where it serves as a counter-argument against the skepticism of “the Academics”. 
The argument is summed up in Baillet as follows: "le pire qu'il nous peut arriver dans ce que nous pensons 
est d'être trompés; mais que nous ne pouvons être trompés sans être effectivement" (Baillet 2012, pp. 973-
4). 
3
  Most likely, as already noted in Doherty 1992, mediated by J. P. Mahaffy's 1880 Descartes. See also Barry 
2009, p. 73. 
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mankind, in a way reminiscent of Beckett's own future aesthetics of failure. It is limitation 
that defines the self and the human: it is through the mistakes we make that we obtain 
confirmation of our own existence. By contrast, Beckett's Descartes does not identify the 
essence of mankind with its capacity to err but, rather, with its participating to the 
substance immatérielle, the res cogitans, in which everything holds together, and which 
does not allow for mistakes or limits.
4
 We see evidence of this suggestion in the stanza's 
final section, where Beckett recalls Descartes' proof of God's existence, and especially in 
the quasi-mystical concluding lines, in which Descartes terms himself a “chip of a perfect 
block that's neither old nor new,/ the lonely petal of a great high bright rose” (Beckett 
2002, p. 8). 
Even the minor allusion to Augustine in this early poem proves to be part of a 
complex intertextual strategy. In this work, Augustine is primarily considered – 
independently of his real views – in opposition to the vision of the universe as a 'perfect 
block', and as the proponent of a theory that defines error and imperfection as inherent to 
life. Accordingly, while it is questionable how much Beckett actually knew about 
Augustine while he was writing Whoroscope, and despite the fact that Augustine appears 
here only as a contrast to the protagonist Descartes, this fragment does enable us to gauge 
a more general understanding of his views, which constituted the starting point of a long -
 term, and deeper, dialogue with the author of the Confessions. Beckett seems to make the 
fictional Augustine stand for the idea of an inevitable link between being, imperfection, 
and guilt. This themes will strongly re-emerge in the Trilogy, Beckett's work that bears 
perhaps the most interesting Augustinian references both thematically (the 
problematisation of identity in memory; narration as a pledge towards some Other; guilt 
and loss as humankind's original states), and stylistically (in the use of the confessional 
mode in passages such as the following: “For I no longer know what I am doing, those are 
things I understand less and less, I don't deny it, for why deny it, and to whom, to you, to 
whom nothing is denied?” (1994, p. 46)).5 By the time Beckett wrote the Trilogy, the 
lesson he had learned from the Confessions had become a carefully integrated aspect of his 
aesthetic project, and a rich and defining feature of his work. Reading Beckett's early 
works in this light, then, we can trace the evolving connection to Augustine and use it to 
study the evolution of his thought and poetics. 
 It was some time after the Whoroscope poem that Beckett began to be seriously 
interested in St. Augustine, and in particular after the publication of his essay on Proust. 
Evidence in the Dream Notebook, written in 1931-32, suggests that Beckett read the 
Confessions right after finishing his essay on the Recherche.
6
 It would probably not be too 
far-fetched to consider Beckett's study of the Confessions as a direct response to Proust, 
his imagination enlivened to the themes of time, memory, and the aesthetic possibilities 
inherent in the autobiographical and confessional genres. 
The numerous entries taken from or inspired by the Confessions in the Dream 
Notebook
7
 demonstrate the attentiveness of Beckett's reading of Augustine's work. 
 
4
 In this sense the expression 'no matter' of the line “No matter, let it pass” can be seen as referring to the 
distinction of the two substances made by the French philosopher. 
5
  See also Olney 1993. 
6
 Some notes on Augustine are also present in the manuscript MS10968, Trinity College Dublin. A more 
comprehensive analysis should not neglect the numerous quotations from Joseph McCabe's St. Augustine 
and his Age which demonstrate Beckett's earnest interest in the author. See Engelberts 2006.  
7
 This does not imply reducing the relation between the published and the unpublished material to that of 
“source versus text” (Caselli 2005, p. 84) but, while keeping the difference between the two, trying to 
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Scholars have linked the quotes to E. B. Pusey's translation of Augustine, that Beckett read 
in a 1907 edition (Bryden 1998, p. 88), but the young writer also engaged with the original 
Latin, as attested by certain copied fragments present in the notebook (Pilling 1999, p. 11). 
These annotations are not only evidence of the intensity and depth of Beckett's auto-
didacticism, as he sought to amplify his already extensive literary knowledge; they also 
reflect a writing technique he had learned from his friend and mentor James Joyce, and 
that he was emulating. These same notes surface in Dream of Fair to Middling Women, his 
first novel, where they mostly appear as intertextual references, easily detectable in the 
fabric of the novel. However, as already noted, Beckett's use of intertextuality  is part of a 
complex strategy that is not always easy to penetrate. Moreover, the author often appears 
more concerned with the pure conceptual or verbal form of the passages he recycles rather 
than with their original context and meaning. This is what Beckett himself seems to claim 
when explaining in a famous interview to Harold Hobson his fascination for another 
Augustinian passage (possibly from Epistle XLVIII).
8 
 
I am interested in the shape of ideas even if I do not believe in them. There is a wonderful 
sentence in Augustine. I wish I could remember the Latin. It is even finer in Latin than in 
English. 'Do not despair; one of the thieves was saved. Do not presume; one of the thieves was 
damned'. That sentence has a wonderful shape. It is the shape that matter. (Hobson 1956, p. 
153) 
This is what mostly happens in Dream, in which the passages taken from the Confessions 
often seem to be quasi-virtuoso asides woven into the text for the pleasure of the author 
and the well-read reader. Here, the Confessions seem to be, as Beckett wrote in a letter to 
McGreevy, nothing more than a field for “phrase hunting” (Beckett 2009, p. 62).9 For 
example at one point Belacqua describes the Smeraldina-Rima, his beloved, with words 
coming straight from a discourse on God in the Confessions (Knowlson 1996, p. 109). 
“She is, she exists in one and the same way, she is every way like her herself, in no way 
can she be injured or changed, she is not subject to time, she cannot at one time be other 
than at another” (Beckett 1993, p. 41). In another passage, in which Belacqua states his 
“absurd dilemma” regarding his conflictual feelings, another such quote from the 
Confessions appears: “when with indifference I remember my past sorrow, my mind has 
indifference, my memory has sorrow. The mind, upon the indifference which is in it, is 
indifferent; yet the memory, upon the sadness which is in it, is not sad” (Beckett 1993, p. 
236. The original passage from Augustine significantly had “joy” for “indifference”).10 
This is the kind of “verbal booty” (Pilling 1999, p. xix) derived from Beckett's readings 
with which he peppers his writing. 
However, Augustine's influence on Beckett does not regard only the form of the text 
and the use of fragments from the Confessions as building material for his novel, but also 
plays an important role from a thematic point of view. In particular, it seems to me that the 
Confessions offered Beckett a series of conceptual and aesthetic tools that enabled him to 
overcome his understanding of the interplay between will, identity, and habit as outlined in 
his early essay Proust. This, as already said, he had just finished writing at the time he 
 
locate them in the same ideal space, a space that is traversed by the history, which might not strictly be 
teleological but that still has to be oriented, of Beckett's creativity.  
8
  See Green 1994. 
9
  For a detailed account of the results of such “phrase hunting” in More Pricks than Kicks see Pilling 2011. 
10
 See also Pilling 1999, pp. 25-26. 
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undertook the reading of Augustine; indeed, it was probably in search of a new perspective 
on these themes that Beckett did it in the first place.  
As Mary Bryden notes, Beckett focussed his attention mostly on Book VIII, the 
section of the Confessions that most overtly addresses these themes. (Bryden 1998, p. 92) 
It is the book which narrates Augustine's conversion, and that features the 'tolle, lege' 
scene addressed earlier in Whoroscope. By the end of the seventh book, Augustine has 
already decided to depart from his heretic ways, but he cannot find the moral strength to 
abandon his former lascivious life for good. As such, he delays the decision: “Give me 
chastity and continence, only not yet” he writes, one of the sentences with a “wonderful 
shape” that Beckett copied in Dream (Beckett 1993, p. 186). Augustine is torn between the 
divine and the earthly world, and interprets the tension as a conflict between two clearly 
defined wills within his soul. 
 
Thus, I understood, by my own experience, what I had read, how the flesh lusteth against the 
spirit and the spirit against the flesh. Myself verily either way; yet more myself, in that which I 
approved in myself, than in that which in myself I disapproved. For in this last, it was now for 
the more part not myself, because in much I rather endured against my will, than acted 
willingly. And yet it was through me that custom had obtained this power of warring against 
me, because I had come willingly, whither I willed or not. (Conf  VIII, 11)
11
 
 
Augustine is split into two distinct wills, the will of the spirit and the will of the flesh. 
While the former is ready for conversion, the latter thwarts it with its inertial force, a 
heaviness that obstructs the rising of the spirit and that eventually brings the author to the 
brink of hysteria. 
 
Lastly, in the very fever of my irresoluteness, I made with my body many such motions as 
men sometimes would, but cannot, if either they have not the limbs, or these be bound with 
bands, weakened with infirmity, or any other way hindered. Thus, if I tore my hair, beat my 
forehead, if locking my fingers I clasped my knee; I willed, I did it. But I might have willed, 
and not done it; if the power of motion in my limbs had not obeyed. So many things then I did, 
when "to will" was not in itself "to be able"; and I did not what both I longed incomparably 
more to do, and which soon after, when I should will, I should be able to do; because soon 
after, when I should will, I should will thoroughly. For in these things the ability was one with 
the will, and to will was to do; and yet was it not done: and more easily did my body obey the 
weakest willing of my soul, in moving its limbs at its nod, than the soul obeyed itself to 
accomplish in the will alone this its momentous will. (Conf. VIII, 20) 
 
Augustine expresses his despair with typical bodily gestures – among which also appears a 
classic posture à la Belacqua: “locking my fingers I clasped my knee”. According to 
Augustine, the impotent will expressed by these gestures is the will of the flesh, for which 
willing does not coincide with being, since between this and that there is the diaphragm of 
the actively doing, the resistance of the physical world. This type of will has to submit 
itself to a compromise with the real, so that if the body, being somehow hampered, cannot 
obey, it eventually has to be frustrated. The hetero-directed intentionality of this faculty 
implies its impossibility to be the direct causation of itself, and is destined to be aborted. 
From this, Augustine deduces the body's ontological inferiority to the will of the spirit, 
that only owes to itself its effectiveness. 
But if the will of the flesh is inferior to the will of the spirit, how is it easier to enact 
the former than the latter? How can the superior succumb to the inferior? Augustine 
 
11
 All the quotes from Augustine are taken from E. B. Pusey's translation, the same used by the author. 
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develops this apparent paradox in the following paragraph, that will have a strong 
resonance in Beckett. 
 
The mind commands the body, and it obeys instantly; the mind commands itself, and is 
resisted. The mind commands the hand to be moved; and such readiness is there, that 
command is scarce distinct from obedience. Yet the mind is mind, the hand is body. The mind 
commands the mind, its own self, to will, and yet it doth not. Whence this monstrousness? and 
to what end? It commands itself, I say, to will, and would not command, unless it willed, and 
what it commands is not done. But it willeth not entirely: therefore doth it not command 
entirely. For so far forth it commandeth, as it willeth: and, so far forth is the thing commanded, 
not done, as it willeth not. For the will commandeth that there be a will; not another, but itself. 
But it doth not command entirely, therefore what it commandeth, is not. For were the will 
entire, it would not even command it to be, because it would already be. It is therefore no 
monstrousness partly to will, partly to nill, but a disease of the mind, that it doth not wholly 
rise, by truth upborne, borne down by custom. And therefore are there two wills, for that one 
of them is not entire: and what the one lacketh, the other hath. (Conf. VIII 21) 
 
Descartes and Geulincx
12
 are often cited in scholarly elucidations of Beckett's quasi-
obsessive interest in the dialectics of body and soul, interiority and exteriority, but 
passages like these might also prove useful in elucidating the author's ideas. In particular, 
these pages feature an element crucial to Beckett, and mostly important in the early phase 
of his career: the fundamental concept of habit, that Augustine introduces in explaining the 
paradox describing the split consciousness as “by truth upborne, borne down by custom”. 
 For Augustine the main point is that since there can be more than one will, the will 
cannot work as a principle of individuation. The will is not co-extended with the soul, but 
can be split into different fragments, which are equally parts of the I, but which clash one 
against the other. “It is therefore no monstrousness partly to will, partly to nill”, he says, 
and the splitting of the identity is nothing but a real “disease of the mind” (aegritudo 
animi), and is in itself part of the natural world order. The cause of this disease, for which 
the soul does not manage to ascend in its entirety to truth is precisely consuetudo, Habit. 
This concept overlaps the will of the flesh, that restrains the soul from conversion, binding 
it to materiality and to the lowest passions, tearing it asunder in the tension thus created. 
There are many aspects in this idea that are not dissimilar from the theory expressed 
by Beckett in Proust. In this essay Beckett used a Schopehauerian approach to interpret 
the Recherche; the two poles of want and boredom that, according to the philosopher, 
represented the two poles between which the human life oscillated, are translated in terms 
of construction and destruction of habit. Habit is defined as “the generic name for the 
countless treaties concluded between the countless subjects that constitute the individual 
and their countless correlative objects” (Beckett 1987, p. 19), that is, as the tendency of 
any human being to mediate his or her relationship with the world through a series of fixed 
patterns that make life easier. In this way a “second reality” (Beckett 1987, p. 19) is built, 
in which the subject can pretend to exist as a fixed being among fixed beings. Habit does 
not hold forever, though, and the treaty has to be rebuilt whenever this second reality is 
torn asunder by a change in the life of the subject. If these traumatic moments are the 
cause of the deepest pain, however, they are at the same time the condition of possibility 
of that transcendence from the world and time that Proust calls “involuntary memory”. 
As in the Confessions, then, Habit is represented as the effect of the inertial force of 
the body and of its friction with reality, and as something that hides the truth (even though, 
of course, Augustine and Beckett hold two very different ideas of truth). However, what is 
 
12
  See Tucker 2012 and Feldman 2006. 
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more interesting in this analogy is the fact that in both cases the authors speak of the split I 
in connection to habit, even though the forms of this splitting are radically different. In 
Proust, the I is split because it actually has no consistency at all, it changes constantly, and 
habit is the veil of Maya that hides this fact, creating the illusion of identity itself. On the 
contrary, in Augustine habit is something negative in relation to the process for attaining 
truth, but it is not in itself a fake, being an actual and active part in the structure of the I. In 
the first case the splitting is diachronical, being the “I of today other than the I of 
yesterday” (Beckett 1987, p. 21), and habit something that bridges over these; in the 
second it is synchronic, and habit is part and cause of the splitting itself. 
What Beckett maintains in Proust, though, does not seem to be his last word on the 
subject, and his opinion evolves in his later works. I do not mean to bridle Beckett's 
oeuvre in a teleological perspective that would inevitably destroy the autonomy of each 
work, but it may be useful to interpret this change in the representation of habit as the 
dialectical solution of the two positions just presented, a process than can be observed in 
the transition from Dream of Fair to Middling Women to Murphy. It is starting from the 
traces left into his work by these texts and ideas that it will be possible to follow Beckett's 
trajectory onwards. 
In Dream, Beckett still appears to endorse the perspective presented in Proust, but 
already suggests a different dialectic of memory, will, and habit. This shift can to a certain 
degree be directly traced to Beckett’s reading of Augustine's meditations on the struggle 
between the will of the flesh and the will of the spirit. In Murphy, habit is no longer a veil 
of Maya in which the true essence of the individual is concealed, but rather  the condition 
of possibility for the subject's flight from the external world towards the truth of the inner 
self. An analysis of the parallel scenes at the beginning of the two novels can serve to 
prove this point. In the first pages of Dream of Fair to Middling Women, the protagonist is 
sitting “on a stanchion at the end of the Carlyle Pier”, thinking about his girlfriend that has 
just left him to go back to Germany. 
 
So now he sagged on the stanchion in the grateful mizzle after the supreme adieu, his hands in 
a jelly in his lap, his head drooped over his hands, pumping up his little blirt. He sat working 
himself up to the little gush of tears that would exonerate him. When he felt them coming he 
switched off his mind and let them settle. First the cautious syring of her in his mind till it 
thudded and spun with the thought of her, then not a second too soon the violent voiding and 
blanking of his mind so that the gush was quelled, it was balked and driven back for a da capo. 
(Beckett 1993, p. 4) 
 
Belacqua first tries to force himself to cry recalling over again the details of her last 
goodbye. He manages to “forc[e] and foil the ebullition in this curious way”, but only for a 
short period since after a while, and against his will, “his mind abode serene and the well 
of tears dry” (Beckett 1993, pp. 4-5). 
 
No sooner had he admitted to himself that there was nothing to be done, that he had tried 
himself quite with this chamber-work of sublimation, that he was seized with a pang of the 
darkest die, and his Smeraldina was swallowed up immediately in the much greater affliction 
of being a son of Adam and cursed with an insubordinate mind. (Beckett 1993, 5) 
 
The pain for the departure of his beloved is immediately swallowed by the greater pain of 
discovering that he cannot even suffer for it as he would want to: “for [Belacqua] the 
Great Dereliction was the silver lining and its impertinent interventions” (Beckett 1993, p. 
6). Beckett reproduces in this way, on a minor scale and with an ironic twist, the same 
process that he had discussed in reference to “the greatest passage that Proust ever wrote – 
Les Intermittences du Coeur” (Beckett 1987, p. 39). In this famous passage the narrator of 
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the Recherche describes how, because of habit, the memory of his dead grandmother fades 
away despite the will to keep it, so that it is as if she were killed again in the dullness of 
his feelings. 
 
But already will, the will to live, the will not to suffer, Habit, having recovered from its 
momentary paralysis, has laid the foundations of its evil and necessary structure, and the 
vision of his grandmother begins to fade and to lose that miraculous relief and clarity that no 
effort of deliberate rememoration can impart or restore. (Beckett 1987, p. 43) 
 
This is why, even though Belacqua first forces himself to cry, he only manages to shed 
tears for a short period.
 
Like Marcel's, Belacqua's mind is represented as subject to the law 
of habit that sears the wounds independently of the will. At the same time, Beckett departs 
from the idea of habit expressed in Proust, introducing the contrast between will of the 
body and will of the soul. Belacqua does not simply realize that he cannot stop changing 
constantly, but also and through it he realizes how his body and his mind are split. This 
aspect, that was not yet present, or not in these terms, in Proust, can be described as the 
intervention of Augustine's Confessions in Beckett's theory of habit. Sure enough, it is 
with a very clear intertext from Augustine that the theme is introduced. 
 
His mind instructed his hand now to stop being clammy and flabby in his lap and to try a little 
fit of convulsion, and they obeyed instanter; but when it instructed itself to pump up a few 
tears in respect of the girl who had left him behind her, then it resisted. (Beckett 1993, p. 5) 
 
In this sense Belacqua's complex identity, his polyphonic being, is different from the 
fragmented identity that Beckett had explained in Proust: Belacqua is not simply different 
one day from the other, he is made up of the conflict between opposite aspects at any 
moment. At the same time, Belacqua's fragmentation of identity does not fully coincide 
with Augustine's, as Beckett adds to the opposition between the will of the flesh and the 
will of the spirit a new element: the absence of both. 
 
At his simplest he was trine. Just think of that. A trine man! Centripetal, centrifugal and . . . 
not. Phoebus chasing Daphne, Narcissus flying from Echo and . . . neither. Is that neat or is it 
not? The chase to Vienna, the flight to Paris, the slouch to Fulda, the relapse into Dublin and . 
. . immunity like hell from journeys and cities. The hand to Lucien and Liebert and the Syra-
Cusa tendered and withdrawn and again tendered and again withdrawn and . . . hands 
forgotten. (Beckett 1987, p. 107)
 
 
 
Behind this triad lies a binary structure: on one side the realm of desire, in which activity 
and passivity keep exchanging their role, in which as soon as the object of desire is 
reached it transforms into something else (Dafne), or in which as soon as the subject is 
free from being chased melts into itself (Narcissus); on the other, the “neither”, the world 
beyond desire, in which the mind forgets itself and the external world and reaches its 
Nirvana. This is Belacqua's “enwombement and entombment”, in which he 
 
lay lapped in a beatitude of indolence that was smoother than oil and softer than a pumpkin, 
dead to the dark pangs of the sons of Adam, asking nothing of the insubordinate mind. He 
moved with the shades of the dead and the dead-born and the unborn and the never to be born, 
in a Limbo purged of desire. (Beckett 1993, p. 44) 
 
In this first novel the possibility of this world beyond becoming and desire is still not fully 
developed and Beckett, and Belacqua with him, remain stuck in the Purgatory of Time. 
This is reflected in the fact that Belacqua is not free to go in and out of this world at his 
will: despite the fact that he tries really hard to access the state of enwombment, he has to 
rely only on chance. 
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Convinced like a fool that it must be possible to induce at pleasure a state so desirable and 
necessary to himself he exhausted his ingenuity experimenting. He left no stone unturned. He 
trained his little brain to hold its breath, he made covenants of all kinds with his senses, he 
forced the lids of the little brain down against the flaring bric-à-brac, in every imaginable way 
he flogged on his coenaesthesis to enwomb him, to exclude the bric-à-brac and expunge the 
consciousness. [...] It was impossible to switch the inward glare, willfully to suppress the 
bureaucratic mind. It was stupid to imagine that he could be organized as Limbo and 
wombtomb, worse than stupid. [...] How could the will be abolished in his own tension? Or the 
mind appeased in paroxisms of disgust? [...] The will and nill cannot suicide, they are not free 
to suicide. [...] He remembers the pleasant gracious bountiful tunnel, and cannot get back. Not 
for the life of him. He keeps chafing and scuffling and fidgeting about, scribbling bad spirals 
with an awful scowl on the “belle face carrée”, instead of simply waiting until the thing 
happens. (Beckett 1993, p. 124) 
 
The necessity of relying on chance to 'enwomb' himself is still a residue of the Proustian 
idea, according to which involuntary memory cannot be actively searched, but have to be 
allowed to happen, the effort to force it being nothing but an obstacle. While for Augustine 
the access to transcendence was allowed through an identification of the various 
conflicting wills within the I with the superior will of God, in Dream Beckett holds on the 
idea expressed in Proust according to which these experiences are not compatible to the 
will, but represent its annihilation. In Dream the Schopenhauerian noluntas (via 
Proustian's involuntary memory) is made to react with the Augustinian idea of conflicting 
wills, but the subsequent reaction is there not yet fully completed.
 
 
The dialectical process through which Beckett eventually overcomes the 
Schopenhauer/Proust/Augustine connection is eventually realised in his next novel, 
Murphy. In the opening scene of the novel, just like in Dream, the protagonist is shown in 
a moment in which the system of his habit has to break: Murphy knows that he will soon 
have to move from the house where he has been “eating, drinking, sleeping, and putting 
his clothes on and off” for six months, and that he will have to learn how to do these 
things in a “quite alien surrounding” (Beckett 1938,  p. 1). In this way, Beckett is directly 
connecting Murphy's situation with the discourse on habit broached in Proust and 
continued in Dream, and which resonates with the Augustinian influence. 
At the same time, the whole process is turned upside down: while Augustine, 
Marcel, and Belacqua were all trying to escape the power of habit in order to achieve the 
aspired change, in Murphy the protagonist tries to overcome the crisis and obtain his 
freedom by siding for habit. Instead of forcing his mind to break off the bounds of habit, 
Murphy reacts by reinforcing it. In binding himself to his rocking chair, he seeks to escape 
from the world of change and to remain entrenched in the world of absolute passivity. 
Murphy tries to make his will totally adhere to his habit, with the heaviness of his body: 
the opposite of Augustine, who was trying as hard as he could to adhere to his soul.  
Beckett, then, follows the same trajectory drawn by Augustine, but in the opposite 
direction: while for Augustine the contradiction is resolved through a liberation of the will 
of the soul thanks to its identification with the will of God, Beckett's Murphy descends 
deeper and deeper into the contradiction, making the self increasingly adhere to habit until 
the body has been entirely reduced to a passive machine. Thus, unlike in Dream of Fair to 
Middling Women or in the essay on Proust, the experience of the enwombement is no 
longer left to chance, but is accessible at will thanks to the rocking chair, that works as a 
real machine for transcendence. 
In this light, Murphy can, up to a point, be interpreted as an atypical Augustinian 
figure: like Augustine before the conversion he, too, is torn between the call for change 
and the resistance and obstructions of the body. Unlike Augustine, though, it is by nailing 
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down the will of the spirit to the will of the flesh, and not the opposite, that Murphy tries 
to solve this contradiction. In the sound of the phrase “Quid pro quo! Quid pro quo!” 
(Beckett 1938, p. 1), which expresses the utilitarian principle of the “Mercantile 
Gehenna”13 that Murphy is invited to share, one can detect an ironical echo of that famous 
“tolle, lege” that triggered Augustine's conversion. He heard those words in the moment of 
profound crisis represented in book VIII and they forced him to read a random passage 
from the Pauline Epistles: 
 
Not in rioting and drunkenness, not in chambering and wantonness, not in strife and envying: 
but put ye on the Lord Jesus Christ, and make no provision for the flesh, in concupiscence. 
(Rom. 13, p. 13-14) 
 
In reading this, Augustine forgets the will of the body, overcomes his habit, and “puts on” 
the Lord Jesus Christ, thus making his will conform to that superior Will. Murphy tries to 
attain the same results (to free himself of the Mercantile Gehenna and worldly 
temptations), but by taking the opposite track: rather than “buttoning his redemptorist 
waistcoat”, as Decartes' Augustine does in in Whoroscope, he remains naked and forgets 
his will completely by making it adhere to the self-imposed limitations of his body. 
For Murphy as for many of Beckett's characters, however, this attempted escape 
from the world will result in a failure. In this case, the failure is brought by by the 
intervention of Celia, whose phone call succeeds where the Quid pro quo call had not, thus 
forcing Murphy to get out of his chair and into the mercantile Gehenna. Hence Celia plays 
in this context the role that in the Confessions was of Monica, Augustine's mother, but 
with a negative connotation. She serves as instigator, attracting Murphy into the outside 
world, attracting “the part of him that he hated [and that] craved for Celia [while] the part 
that he loved shrivelled up at the thought of her” (Beckett 1938, p. 8). 
Then, when in chapter three Murphy is eventually coaxed by Celia into seeking a 
job, after having buttoned his (redemptorist?) shirt, we find two major Augustinian 
intertexts that confirm Augustine's influence and its connection to these themes. Here, 
Murphy is trying to convince Celia that finding a job would prove fatal for him, and they 
start quarrelling; Celia, who has just brought Murphy his horoscope (upon his request), is 
on the cusp of leaving when Murphy surrenders.  
 
He closed his eyes and fell back. It was not his habit to make out cases for himself. An atheist 
chipping a deity was not more senseless than Murphy defending his course of inaction, as he 
did not require to be told. He had been carried away by his passion for Celia and by a most 
curious feeling that he should not collapse without at least the form of a struggle. This grisly 
relic from the days of nuts, balls, and sparrows astonished himself. To die fighting was the 
perfect antithesis of his whole practice, faith, and intention. (Beckett 1938, p. 10) 
 
The reference to “the days of nuts, balls, and sparrows” is a quote from Conf. I, xviii. 
Here, in his prayer to God, Augustine recollects his youth as a boisterous child and how 
while playing with others he preferred “to quarrel rather than to yield”. Like the young 
Augustine, Murphy does not want to yield, until he realises the paradox inherent in trying 
to defend a passive stance through active resistance. This realisation catalyses the 
acceptance of Celia's blackmail, the decision to look for a job, and the breaking of his 
habit, leading then to his entering into the mercantile Gehenna and accepting the principle 
of Quid pro quo. 
 
13
 The term Gehenna itself is probably another of the many loans from Augustine (see Pilling 2004, p. 49,  
and Ackerley 2004). 
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 This decision will lead first to the confrontation to that much more tragic and 
disturbing form of passivity represented by Mr Endon and the patients of the Magdalen 
Mental Mercyseat, and then to the final annihilation of the main character. Murphy's 
willed reduction of the will to impotence, then, ends in a failure: adding the will not to will 
to Augustine's conflicting wills does not solve the problem of Beckett's characters, nor the 
philosophical problem of identity, but opens it up to a fresh perspective. This path will 
lead to the abandonment of the dream of a self-annihilating will, and the beginning of the 
investigation of that in-between in which passivity and activity, will and nill, annihilation 
and creation, coalesce and react. 
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